Information resilience as a pillar of national security

Article by Nazeli Baghdasaryan, Press Secretary of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

It is hardly a revelation to observe that ahead of the elections in Armenia, there has been an increase in disinformation campaigns in the context of hybrid attacks. This is not about ordinary political debate or pre-election rhetoric, but about organized disinformation and foreign information manipulation aimed at systematically weakening trust in state institutions, the electoral process, and the country’s strategic priorities.

Such interventions are particularly active during the pre-election period, attempting to confuse voters, reduce voter participation, and accentuate societal divisions. Even small manipulations that are not neutralized in time can have a cumulative effect on public trust and perceptions of election results, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the elections.

Our research shows that, in practice, the disinformation chain often starts with lesser-known websites or anonymous platforms. The same content is then systematically spread through social media and Telegram channels. The goal is not so much to persuade as to create artificial visibility in the information field through the manipulation of algorithms, the creation of false consensus, and the promotion of externally driven agendas.

Later, the same stories infiltrate the Armenian media domain, presented as originating from "trusted sources." At this stage, the role of the media becomes crucial: the decision to verify or not verify information before publication can determine whether fake news stops spreading or continues to circulate, gaining "institutional legitimacy" and influencing public perceptions.

Recently, coordinated networks of fake or anonymous accounts that publish identical messages simultaneously, artificially inflate engagement rates, and promote politically sensitive content have also become more prominent. Coordinated bot networks such as Matryoshka, Storm, and DragonBridge synchronously spread the same narratives on the X (Twitter) platform, creating a false illusion of broad public support.

This constitutes a form of pressure on the information environment, the purpose of which is to distort public sentiment and create the illusion of a crisis atmosphere. Among the new challenges is a noticeable increase in the use of artificial intelligence, including AI-generated texts, manipulated recordings, fake videos, and fabricated ''documents.''

These developments are changing the nature of threats, making them faster, more scalable, and more difficult to predict. Therefore, it is necessary not only to respond to such threats, but also to develop preventive capabilities at the technological, analytical, and legal levels.

Certainly, the real target of these actions is not any single political force. The target is public trust in elections, the reputation of state institutions, and democratic processes. Disinformation narratives, if neutralized late or incompletely, can reduce voter turnout and weaken state stability in the long term.

For Armenia, information resilience is not an abstract concept. It is an essential prerequisite for maintaining sovereignty, democracy, state stability, and legitimacy. It is becoming imperative to establish information resilience as a full-fledged component of national security.

This is because hybrid threats - disinformation, cyber operations, and coordinated information manipulation - are aimed at weakening the state from within, dividing society, and undermining trust in strategic decisions. It is undeniable that transparency, a culture of fact-checking, media literacy programs, responsible journalism, and institutional accountability are not only democratic values, but also key factors in strengthening national security today.

This is the point at which all efforts must be unified.