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On March 26, the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia fully adopted, in the second reading, the Law on Launching the Accession Process of the Republic of Armenia to the European Union. The draft law was submitted to the National Assembly by the civil initiative group “Eurovote”, which succeeded in collecting 60,000 citizens’ signatures within the legally defined timeframe. The official goals of the law’s adoption are the development of democratic institutions, the improvement of public welfare, and the strengthening of national security, resilience, and the rule of law.
The decision to launch the EU accession process represents more of a strategic shift in Armenia’s foreign policy than a dramatic U-turn. It reflects growing public support for closer integration with Europe and highlights Armenia’s aspiration for a more diversified framework of international cooperation. At the same time, the process of integration with the EU comes with considerable challenges—especially in light of Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia and its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union.
Public Perception
According to the “Annual Survey 2023 – Armenia: Perception of the European Union,” conducted by the EU's Regional Communication Programme for the Eastern Neighbourhood, 60% of respondents expressed trust in the European Union—higher than the level of trust in any other international institution, according to the survey. In the 2024 edition of the same survey, 66% of respondents reported trust in the EU. Additionally, 75% stated they would like the EU to play a greater role in strengthening the country’s defense. It should be emphasized that public trust in the EU is not a new phenomenon in Armenian society. According to previous surveys conducted by the same program, trust in the EU ranged from 55% to 70% between 2017 and 2022. The only exception was in 2021, when trust dropped to 43%, which was linked to the general decline in public trust toward international actors in Armenia following the events of 2020.
According to a survey conducted by the GALLUP International Association in Armenia in July 2024, 56.7% of respondents supported Armenia’s EU membership. Of those, 34.2% stated that Armenia should definitely pursue EU membership, while 22.5% responded “rather yes.”
In a September 2024 survey by the International Republican Institute, several key insights emerged regarding Armenia-EU relations. 20% of respondents said Armenia’s foreign policy should be oriented exclusively toward the EU and the West; 31% said it should be pro-Western while maintaining relations with Russia; 20% said it should be pro-Russian while keeping ties with the West; and 6% believed it should be entirely pro-Russian. In total, 58% of respondents said they would vote in favor of Armenia joining the EU. Notably, 66% of respondents aged 55 and older expressed willingness to vote for EU membership, compared to 61% in the 36–55 age group, and 46% in the 18–35 age group.
It is also important to highlight that 40% of respondents saw the primary benefit of EU membership in the strengthening of security and stability, while 11% emphasized economic advantages, and another 11% cited national development. As for the perceived drawbacks, 22% pointed to the deterioration of family values, 21% noted a lack of support from the EU, 12% expressed concern over "angering" Russia, and only 6% mentioned potential negative economic consequences.
Safety and Security
Public opinion research in recent years shows that, overall, there is a positive attitude toward the European Union in Armenia, and at least half of the population views the prospect of EU membership favorably. At the same time, a deeper analysis of polling data reveals that many Armenians perceive the deepening of relations with the EU primarily through the lens of enhancing Armenia’s security and defense capabilities.
In this context, it is important to note that the European Union is not a defense alliance, and Europe’s current security still heavily depends on NATO and the United States. Given the policies and approach of the current U.S. administration toward European defense, the EU’s most pressing challenge today is to secure its own defense, develop a clear strategy to reduce dependence on the United States, and build an independent European security architecture. For example, France is actively promoting the idea of creating a European army, several countries have announced increases in defense spending, and the EU’s future security strategy is under active discussion.
While defense is not a central focus of Armenia-EU relations, Yerevan and Brussels have nonetheless begun gradually strengthening cooperation in the field of security, including the development of mechanisms aimed at reinforcing Armenia’s national security system.
The European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA)
In response to a request from Yerevan, the EU deployed a civilian observation mission in Armenia in January 2023. EUMA is tasked with impartially and objectively monitoring and reporting on the security situation along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, supporting stability in Armenia’s border regions, building trust, and creating conditions conducive to the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this context, it is important to note that the mission has repeatedly and indirectly refuted Azerbaijani claims alleging that Armenian forces opened fire on Azerbaijani positions or amassed military equipment near the border. Although EUMA is a civilian mission, it has functioned as a stabilizing factor in the region, with the number of border incidents reportedly decreasing since its deployment. In January 2025, the EU Council decided to extend the mission’s mandate until February 19, 2027. The mission’s personnel currently consists of 225 members.
Support from the European Peace Facility and Appointment of a Military Attaché in Brussels
The European Peace Facility is intended to strengthen the defense capacities of the EU’s partner countries. In July 2024, the EU Council approved a €10 million assistance package for the Armenian Armed Forces. This funding is designated for the acquisition of non-lethal equipment. According to March 2025 reports, the EU is considering providing an additional €10 million in non-lethal military aid to Armenia. It is noteworthy that Hungary has conditioned its support for Armenia’s assistance on the European Union providing equivalent aid to Azerbaijan.
Another important step in Armenia-EU security cooperation was the appointment of a military attaché in Brussels. In March 2025, Armenia’s Ministry of Defense approved the establishment of a defense representation office in the EU and Belgium. The aim is to expand communication and cooperation on security-related matters.
Political and Security Dialogue
On January 26, 2023, Yerevan hosted the first high-level meeting of the Armenia-EU Political and Security Dialogue. These dialogue sessions have since become regular and ongoing. Deputy Foreign Minister Paruyr Hovhannisyan stated that other formats of cooperation in the security field are being discussed within the framework of this dialogue.
Armenia-European Union New Partnership Agenda
According to official statements, Armenia and the European Union are expected to sign a New Partnership Agenda in the near future. Some sources indicate that the document will also address security-related issues. It is known that the document is a framework agreement, and further details have not yet been officially disclosed. It is important to emphasize that, despite the anticipated signing of this new document, the primary legal framework governing Armenia-EU relations remains the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which was signed in 2017 and has not yet been fully implemented.
We can state that, in terms of Armenia-EU relations, the mechanisms currently in place are likely insufficient to meet public expectations. Given the ongoing internal EU discussions on defense and security, it may be more advantageous for Armenia to deepen bilateral defense cooperation with individual European countries.
Although information on defense cooperation often involves a certain degree of confidentiality, some details are publicly available. Armenia is notably expanding its defense partnership with France. It has purchased three GM-200 radars, 50 Bastion armored vehicles, 36 Caesar 155mm Artillery System, as well as firearms and other equipment. In addition, France is supporting Armenia’s defense reforms. Trilateral defense consultations between Armenia, Greece, and Cyprus are held regularly, and reciprocal visits between defense officials and European counterparts have intensified.
At the same time, it should be stressed that the mentioned mechanisms represent only a part of Armenia’s broader strategy of diversifying its defense policy, and Yerevan is also intensifying security cooperation with other non-European or non-Western actors.
Economy
The European Union is primarily an economic union, and when examining the economic relations between Armenia and the EU, it is important to note that the situation is markedly different. According to data from the RA Statistical Committee, in 2023, the share of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries in Armenia's foreign trade was 36.8%, of which 35.3% belonged to Russia. In 2024, the EAEU's share increased to 42.2%, with Russia accounting for 41.1%. Meanwhile, the share of EU countries was 12.9% in 2023 but fell to 7.7% in 2024. Energy dependence on Russia remains significant as well. According to the Public Services Regulatory Commission, in 2023, 86.4% of Armenia's gas imports came from Russia, with the remainder, 13.6%, from Iran. In 2024, Russia accounted for 83.7% of gas imports. Additionally, in 2024, 65.5% of the remittances sent to Armenia — amounting to $3.8 billion — originated from Russia.
Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia poses significant obstacles on its path toward EU membership. We consulted sector experts on this and related issues. Mane Adamyan, an expert on strategic cooperation with the EU, highlighted that gas imports are the most sensitive economic issue for Armenia, not only due to pricing policies but also because of the lack of alternative infrastructure capable of handling the volumes currently supplied by Russia. Currently, no infrastructure exists that can match Russia's supply capacity. As noted earlier, Russia holds a dominant and growing share in Armenia's foreign trade, while the EU's share continues to decline. Being a member of the EAEU, Armenia cannot sign a free trade agreement with the EU. Therefore, Adamyan stressed the need for a thorough study and impact assessment of the consequences of terminating EAEU membership for Armenia’s economy before engaging in discussions on a free trade agreement with the EU.
According to Adamyan, Armenia can and should deepen integration with the European Union across multiple sectors. The country must continue its reform processes and fully implement the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). The expert further emphasized the importance of distinguishing EU membership from EU integration — deepening integration does not require full membership and allows Armenia to select specific areas for closer cooperation. Moreover, several countries — such as Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein — are deeply integrated with the EU and are part of the EU single market without being full members. Given Armenia's geographic and geopolitical situation, Adamyan noted that full harmonization with EU economic and security policies would be difficult to envision, particularly considering Armenia’s relations with neighboring Iran and Russia. Simultaneously, the expert pointed out that EU membership is a complex and lengthy integration process, and Armenia must develop this path gradually, step by step. Should geopolitical circumstances evolve favorably in the next 10–15 years, Armenia would have already advanced through significant integration, making full membership more feasible and realistic.
Additionally, the expert emphasized the critical importance of attracting investments, reducing energy dependence on a single source, finding alternative partners, building alternative infrastructure, developing domestic alternative energy sources, and creating reserves. Likewise, alternatives to Russia must be identified in other economic sectors to diversify capital sources. Adamyan also cautioned that the integration process must be managed carefully to avoid setbacks or grounds for freezing existing programs, noting lessons learned from Georgia’s experience.
Economist Aghasi Tavadyan discussed Armenia’s export and import challenges. He observed that withdrawing from the EAEU and joining another integration structure today would pose greater difficulties than in 2018, because since 2018, Armenia’s exports to the EAEU market have increased fivefold. In 2018, exports to the EAEU amounted to $688 million, rising to $3.345 billion in recent years, while exports to the EU have declined by approximately 10% — from $676 million in 2018 (roughly equal to the EAEU figure then) to $611 million, representing only 4.7% of total exports. Addressing re-exports to Russia under Western sanctions, Tavadyan noted that in 2024, re-exports to the EAEU accounted for about 40% of total re-exports, while “net” exports have tripled since 2018. Regarding export composition, 80–90% of finished products are sent to Russia. Redirecting exports to the EU market will face considerable challenges related to compliance with European standards, brand recognition, and logistics.
The economist expressed the view that even if Armenia could export to the EU duty-free under a free trade agreement, it would likely become a cheap raw material supplier, with goods standardized and then re-imported to Armenia at a high cost. Tavadyan stressed that although the EU market is large, competition is intense, creating significant challenges for Armenian producers. Therefore, economists recommend that Armenia take preliminary steps to diversify exports, focus on multiple markets including the Middle East, and establish high product standards. Furthermore, Armenia should consider closer integration with the EU across various sectors before full membership. Simultaneously, unblocking regional transport corridors could boost economic diversification and export growth.
Membership or Integration?
The issue of Armenia's accession to the European Union has become prominent in public discourse, largely due to concerns about the country’s security. A significant portion of the public links the desire for membership to the possibility of security guarantees from the EU. However, it is important to recognize that the European Union itself is not a security-exporting organization and cannot fully provide the vital security assurances Armenia requires. Beyond security concerns, withdrawing from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and integrating into the EU’s economic and market system represents a major structural challenge for Armenia. The Armenian economy is deeply integrated with the EAEU market, and achieving compatibility with the EU in areas such as energy, trade, and free movement of labor demands a long-term strategy, institutional reforms, and substantial investments. In addition to these challenges, Armenia’s path toward EU membership requires political clarity, including the establishment of stable democratic institutions, the rule of law, and foreign policy practices aligned with those of the EU. At the same time, the experiences of Turkey, the Balkan states, the Eastern Partnership countries—Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova—as well as Eastern European EU members such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and others, should be carefully considered as precedents for Armenia’s own accession process.
Taking all these factors into account, it is clear that while EU membership may be a long-term strategic goal for Armenia, it cannot be viewed at present as a quick solution to the country’s security or economic challenges. Instead, Armenia should pursue a multi-layered, balanced foreign policy, prioritizing institutional stability and domestic unity, while simultaneously keeping the door open for deeper European integration and the prospect of EU membership. This approach entails deepening cooperation with the EU across political, economic, cultural, and educational spheres. Within this framework, membership should not be seen as the sole objective but rather as a long-term strategic outcome resulting from progressive integration, joint initiatives, and shared values.
Vardui Harutyunyan
"Orbeli " Center
The views expressed in the article are the personal opinion of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the editorial board.