'Success depends on navigating regional complexities,' - Quincy Institute researcher on Crossroads of Peace

BRUSSELS, DECEMBER 30, ARMENPRESS. A critical need in Armenia is for the various factions to work together more cohesively. This involves the government being more inclusive and allowing diverse voices to contribute meaningfully to policy debates. At the same time, the opposition must adopt a more productive stance—one focused on addressing the crises facing Armenia rather than merely reactively criticizing the government. Such unity, though perhaps optimistic to hope for, is ultimately essential for Armenia to rebuild and move forward as a cohesive nation, Artin DerSimonian, research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an American think tank, told Armenpress.

Artin DerSimonian gave an interview to Armenpress Brussels correspondent on the developments in the South Caucasus, the growing influence of Turkiye, its ties with Russia, as well as trends in Azerbaijan.

How do you assess the recent developments in the South Caucasus in general?

Over the past four years, since the end of the Second Karabakh War, there has been a significant shift in the dynamics of the region. This has become particularly evident in the last two years—especially post-September 2023—with the balance of power having clearly shifted. This is apparent not only in the military situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan but also in the rhetoric coming from officials in both Baku and Yerevan.

In Baku, officials tend to speak with much more confidence and assertiveness. This confidence is backed by a military capacity that Azerbaijan has been seriously developing for at least a decade and a half to a level they now feel confident in. On the other hand, in Armenia, even this current government—which six years ago spoke with a strong voice and seemed confident in its position—now speaks far more cautiously. It is working to rebuild its military and strategic capacities, but the insecurity it feels is clearly reflected in its policies and rhetoric.

As we approach the end of the year, there are many moving parts in the region. For example, the increase in cargo flights between Israel and Azerbaijan, meetings between Turkish defense officials and their Azerbaijani counterparts, and escalating rhetorical confrontations highlight a precarious moment in regional security.

There has been concern that following the COP29 Summit and the U.S. presidential election—especially with a Trump victory—Azerbaijan might take advantage of any perceived changes in American foreign policy to press its position further. It will be interesting to see how a new administration in Washington responds to potential escalations. Will it act as strongly as the Biden administration did in response to cross-border shootings? 

In 2024, many crises either arose or continued, and none of them have been fully resolved. As we look ahead to 2025, it seems likely that we will face these challenges more acutely.

What are the prerequisites for establishing stable peace in the region? In other words, what steps are necessary to achieve lasting peace and regional stability in the South Caucasus?

Achieving sustainable, genuine peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan requires much more than just signing a document with 16 or 17 points. True peace is a generational project, if not longer, involving a fundamental rebuilding of relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. This may include, for instance, the eventual return of Azerbaijanis who once lived in Armenia and Armenians who once lived in Baku and other parts of Azerbaijan. Such aspirations represent a long-term vision of genuine reconciliation.

In the short term, we could hope to see the signing of the agreement that has been discussed over the last few years. Every year, officials in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other stakeholders claim that a deal will be finalized by year’s end, but it has not yet materialized.

However, Azerbaijan, throughout this process, appears to have an incentive to stall and see what more it might gain. Regional developments could influence this further. For example, if U.S.-Russia negotiations initiated by Trump over Ukraine falter, or if Iran faces further instability in the Middle East, Azerbaijan might see these as opportunities to push its advantage. Similarly, if France or the EU face domestic crises or Turkey continues to feel emboldened, such as by events in Syria, Azerbaijan may leverage these situations diplomatically or militarily.

Stable peace feels like a distant prospect at the moment. In the short term, maintaining the current low levels of violence would already be significant. 

It will also be important to see how the incoming U.S. administration engages in the South Caucasus. The still-developing post-election situation in Georgia will likely take center stage in the new Congress, and it remains to be seen whether the Trump administration will continue the same approach as the Biden administration. 

This also applies to Armenia and Azerbaijan—will Trump’s State Department engage as actively as Biden’s? Will the new National Security Advisor attempt to facilitate Armenian and Azerbaijani dialogue, even if only as the host of a neutral meeting ground?

In the short term, the best-case scenario would include limited or no hostilities, continued diplomatic engagement, and a reduction in hostile rhetoric between the two sides. 

A significant issue, however, is the lack of dialogue on critical topics that matter for achieving peace. For instance, could the two sides manage environmental issues collaboratively? Could they meaningfully demilitarize their border rather than focusing on mutual accusations? Addressing these practical concerns would be a good sign of progress toward real regional peace.

In Armenia, there are distinct voices representing differing perspectives. On one side, opposition voices—often extremely critical—tend to frame the situation as dire, with a "doom and gloom" mentality. Everything is seen as a concession or a failure. On the other side, you have the government and its supporters, who, while expressing some concern and caution, adopt a more optimistic tone.

The reality, however, lies somewhere in between. Armenia’s current situation is undeniably precarious—arguably the most uncertain it has been since gaining independence. While the government is aware of these challenges, it is understandable that they attempt to project stability and control. Yet, the past five years have shown that events often unfold faster than the government can react to or even anticipate.

A critical need in Armenia is for the various factions to work together more cohesively. This involves the government being more inclusive and allowing diverse voices to contribute meaningfully to policy debates. At the same time, the opposition must adopt a more productive stance—one focused on addressing the crises facing Armenia rather than merely reactively criticizing the government. Such unity, though perhaps optimistic to hope for, is ultimately essential for Armenia to rebuild and move forward as a cohesive nation.

The developments in the Middle East have once again shown that international actors are striving to strengthen their roles in unstable regions. What kind of power dynamics do you observe in the South Caucasus? What influence and intentions does the collective West have in the South Caucasus today?

Over the past four years, the EU and the U.S. have primarily responded to events in the South Caucasus rather than proactively shaping the situation. This is evident with the deployment of the EU monitoring mission along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan.

This mission followed the escalations of September 2022, when Yerevan expressed dissatisfaction with the response and support offered by the CSTO and Russia. In turn, Armenia opted for an EU civilian mission, which has generally been successful. The mission has grown in scale and scope, with both the Armenian government and European officials expressing interest in extending its mandate.

However, this mission has inevitably become entangled in the broader negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, having no external forces—even unarmed monitors—along its border with Armenia is preferable. 

How do you explain Azerbaijan’s attitude toward the EU monitoring mission and related issues?

Azerbaijan’s position is partly influenced by the risk of escalation. If there were renewed conflict, Azerbaijan would not want to be held responsible for any harm to European monitors. However, there is also a broader dynamic at play: Azerbaijan sees itself as the dominant power in the South Caucasus and seeks to dictate terms to Armenia.

This attitude is evident in various demands, such as limiting Armenia’s procurement of new weapons systems or opposing the presence of third-party personnel along the border. Azerbaijan’s message to Armenia is essentially, "We set the rules, and you must follow them—or face the consequences." While those consequences are not always clear, past actions have demonstrated what they might entail.

Armenia, on the other hand, has asserted its sovereignty, particularly regarding issues like monitoring missions and arms procurement. The Armenian government’s position is that these decisions are internal matters and not subject to external dictation.

There is also a parallel with the rhetoric used by Russia regarding Ukraine—citing militarization as justification for preemptive action. Azerbaijan has occasionally employed similar arguments, suggesting it might act if it perceives a threat from Armenia. This rhetoric could be used to justify aggressive actions, akin to how Israel is currently operating in Syria: “intentions are not important, potential is important.”

For Armenia, the challenge is to navigate these dynamics carefully. While mindful of potential provocations, Armenia must continue to prioritize its security and act in its own national interests.

Coming back to the Western Engagement in the South Caucasus…

I think overall, the EU monitoring mission has been the most successful area of Western engagement in the last few years. Like we talked about with negotiations, the US and EU have played a role facilitating at times and mediating at others, and that's important. I believe if an opportunity arises for the Europeans or Americans to play that role again, then they should. I think it's useful, it's helpful, it keeps us engaged, and it's for a good cause.

But at the end of the day, there is this issue of geography. Of course, with modern technology, communications across some mountains or an ocean are not as challenging as they once were. But when push comes to shove, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are directly abutted by three very large and important powers that have been there for hundreds of years. Even the issue of France trying to supply arms into Armenia illustrates this. It can't just cross its own border like into Belgium or Germany—it must go through other players.

It's very uncertain what the regional makeup will look like in 2025. If the Georgian Dream stays in power, it may restrict that trade in some way. Or maybe Yerevan’s support these last few months will be repaid by allowing such deliveries to continue. Europeans and Americans know that this geographic factor is significant. The Armenian government is also aware of it. I believe we'll see continued engagement with economic support, financing of development projects, and civil society support, which has expanded exponentially in the last couple of years in Armenia. Hopefully, the EU and U.S. will also back institution building in Armenia, rather than just supporting and endorsing the current ruling party and its democratic credentials.

For Armenia, the crucial need is security. Without security, foreign investors will not want to put large sums of money in, and the Armenian government won't even have the luxury to consider these other things. Balancing has been a struggle—it’s either all in this way or that way. Armenia needs to learn to play the game of balancing countries off each other, both in its own region as well as in the wider world.

Armenia is attempting to normalize relations with both Turkey and Azerbaijan. How would you evaluate Turkey’s role in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and in the region as a whole?

Briefly, I think the developments in Syria are a good metaphor for Turkey's ambitions and interests more broadly. Around a decade ago, Iran and Russia became involved in Syria in a way that prevented Turkey from achieving its goals at the time. But now, as we saw almost exactly one month ago with the assault on Aleppo, Turkish proxy forces or other forces it supports such as HTS have shifted the balance. With Assad’s fall, Iran's position weakened, Russia finds itself in a precarious situation, and Turkey has an improved regional posture.

Turkish rivalry with Russia has always been there. What’s interesting now is that it’s much less contained to the traditional space. Turkey's ambitions stretch from Libya to the Middle East, parts of the Balkans, the Black Sea, and into the South Caucasus and beyond. There’s often competitive cooperation with Russia. While many in Moscow may believe in and envision more cooperation than competition, Ankara tends to see the opposite.

In the South Caucasus, Turkey’s role is growing. However, Azerbaijan, while closely aligned with Turkey, doesn’t want to be just the "little brother" anymore. Azerbaijan wants more flexibility, and its trying to achieve this by enhancing ties with Russia and. It’s an interesting dynamic to watch as Azerbaijan navigates these relationships while still maintaining synergy with Turkey.

Concerning the regional connectivity each country in the region has its own perspective on unblocking regional communications. Azerbaijan refers to it as the “Zangezur Corridor,” Iran calls it the “Araks Corridor,” while the Armenian authorities describe it as the “Crossroads of Peace.” What is your perspective on this project, and to what extent is it aligned with the interests of Western powers?

From the American perspective, the Biden administration and State Department officials have made it clear that this is a great potential route connecting Turkey and Europe through the South Caucasus into Central Asia. This avoids Russia and Iran, which has been a long-standing Western objective, as seen in energy projects from the late 1990s. For the Europeans, too, avoiding Russia and Iran is a clear priority, especially considering recent tensions.

For Armenia, the Crossroads of Peace has been promoted tirelessly. But without normalized relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, this project is essentially a piece of paper with some discussions about future opportunities and investments. Regionally, trade and connectivity discussions have increased due to the war in Ukraine. Therefore, it’s important for Armenia to consider how its own plans overlap (or not) with those of its neighbors. 

In the short term, connectivity projects like these are hypothetical, but they remain potentially significant in the longer term. Success depends on navigating regional complexities, achieving agreements, and balancing relationships.

There’s an interest from the Europeans and Americans to see these trade routes opened, which means there’s an interest in seeing normalization of ties. My concern has been that Washington or Brussels are maybe too eager to see any agreement signed—even if that agreement doesn’t lead to a sustainable peace—solely so that this type of project can make some progress. However, even that’s not guaranteed. We could have normalization of relations and this project could still be stalled for whatever reason. So nothing is guaranteed. 

Ultimately, the Trump administration will certainly have many, many other priorities ahead of the South Caucasus when it takes office on January 20.