The Normalization of Armenian-Turkish Relations: A Challenging Yet Unavoidable Journey

Armenia's senior officials consistently highlight the nation's readiness to reopen all transportation connections passing through its territory in all directions. The initiative put forward by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, aimed at turning Armenia into a "Crossroad of Peace" demonstrates that the issue of utilizing the North-South and East-West transport corridors is a priority and a key objective for Armenia's current development.

In May 1993, during the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Turkish government closed the railway and road routes into Armenia and imposed an economic embargo, which meant a complete ban on exports of goods and services from Armenia. Efforts to resolve bilateral relations, which began during that period, remained fruitless despite the active dialogue and intense negotiations.

It should be noted that since the end of 1991, Armenia had officially advocated for the normalization of relations with neighboring Turkey without preconditions. The Turkish authorities, who had recognized Armenia among the 11 Soviet republics but had not established diplomatic relations with it, set several preconditions in order to establish normal relations with Armenia. Two of these preconditions were the most significant.

The first was the demand to abandon the process of international recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

The second was the demand for unilateral concessions in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process and the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the conflict zone. Discussion of other, relatively less significant preconditions did not occur, as there was no consensus on accepting these preconditions.

During the presidencies of both the first president Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the second president Robert Kocharian, and the third president Serzh Sargsyan, steps were taken to normalize relations with Turkey and restore the closed international transportation corridors.

In the early 2000s, with the mediation of American diplomacy, a public dialogue was initiated, which came to be known as the "Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission." The discussions, which lasted for several years between Armenian and Turkish public representatives, did not lead to the emergence of a broad movement in the societies aimed at revitalizing the resolution process. In the spring of 2005, then Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan exchanged letters with Armenian second President Robert Kocharyan, in which both sides expressed their desire to finally engage in the resolution process. However, for a number of reasons, this initiative also yielded no results.

Back in 2008, President Serzh Sargsyan invited President Abdullah Gül to Armenia to watch a football match between the national teams of the two countries. The diplomatic process that began on this symbolic occasion came to be known as "football diplomacy." The process was sponsored by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, under whose leadership American diplomacy made some efforts to energize the resolution process. In 2009, as a result of secret negotiations, and with the mediation of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two protocols were prepared, which were presented to the foreign ministers of the two countries for signing.

 In Zurich, under the initiative of Hillary Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner joined Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandyan in signing the protocols. However, it soon became clear that Turkish public opinion, under the pressure of Azerbaijani public opinion, was not ready for normalizing relations with Armenia. As a result, the two protocols presented for ratification by the parliaments were withdrawn, and the process was halted.

In the beginning of 2011, Turkey and later Armenia officially declared the failure of football diplomacy. After the 44-day war in 2020, Turkey, having achieved its political goals in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, once again expressed its willingness to engage in negotiations aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries.

At first, it seemed that the negotiations would progress from the point where they had stalled in 2009-2010. However, it became clear that under the new circumstances, Turkey would raise the same set of preconditions it had previously prepared for Armenia.

In any case, the information circulating in the media within Armenian society suggests that Turkey has two primary preconditions for establishing diplomatic relations, as well as other preconditions dating back to the 1920s. For example, one of these demands is the removal of the image of Mount Ararat from Armenia’s coat of arms.

Overall, it seems that the process is continuing without major obstacles or failures. The main point of interest for Turkey and Azerbaijan is the reopening of the Yerevan (Armenia)-Nakhchivan-Julfa (Azerbaijan)-Meghri (Armenia) railway and the parallel highway, which had been closed since the early days of the collapse of the Soviet Union due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia recently (for the umpteenth time) reaffirmed its willingness to reopen all transport routes passing through its territory, including those previously mentioned.

Two years ago Armenian political circles were discussing the information that Turkey and Azerbaijan wanted to communicate via transport routes that were practically free of restrictions for them through Armenia, but without opening roads connecting Turkey and, specifically, Azerbaijan. This, of course, complicated the atmosphere of political negotiations and moved the prospect of complete mutual understanding further away.

Last year, a Turkish journalist asked President Erdoğan when relations with Armenia would be normalized. The Turkish president responded briefly: “As soon as President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev calls me.” It must be understood that over the past 16-17 years, there has been no significant change in Turkey’s foreign policy discourse, and the resolution of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations ultimately determines the resolution of Armenian-Turkish relations.

 Thus, without interrupting the resolution process (as there are no significant reasons to do so at this time), Turkish diplomacy is waiting for the signing of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty. It is worth mentioning that there are two remaining points to be agreed upon in the ongoing negotiations regarding this treaty, and discussions continue. It is true that no information has yet been provided about the next meeting of the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is also clear that even seemingly small events, such as Armenia extradited two individuals to Turkey, who were involved in organized crime activities there, in response to a request from Interpol under its Red Notice have become significant moments and contribute to the creation of a very difficult atmosphere of mutual trust.

In the last two years, no sociological studies have been conducted regarding the attitudes of Armenian and Turkish societies. However, it is known that public opinion in Armenia is generally negative toward establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey and restoring transportation links. In Turkey, there is also a prevailing negative attitude among the majority of the population toward Armenia and Armenians.

Nevertheless, without exaggerating, it can be asserted that the international community is expecting both countries to resolve their relations, primarily for the unimpeded and dynamic restoration of the aforementioned strategic international transportation corridors. This reality is well understood, for example, by Azerbaijani President Aliyev, who is attempting to present himself to the international community as the key political figure successfully implementing this prospect. Turkish diplomacy (apparently with internal consensus) has ceded the leading role in the process to Azerbaijani President Aliyev and his diplomatic team.

The Turkish president has recently stated that, in his assessment, the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty may be signed by 2025. This is an optimistic scenario, which suggests that Armenian-Turkish relations could also make progress, and the roads connecting the two countries will finally be opened.

And finally, one economic factor. During the previous 32 years, when the import of Armenian goods to Turkey was prohibited, Turkish products nevertheless penetrated the Armenian market widely. According to expert estimates over the last 25 years, the volume of Turkish-origin products in the Armenian market has amounted to over $40 million annually. In the past few years, based on approximate expert calculations, this figure has reached about $600 million.

Thus, Turkey ranks relatively high (5th or 6th) among Armenia’s economic partners, despite the fact that official Armenian-Turkish trade relations do not directly exist. It should also be noted that certain Armenian-origin products (such as metal scrap or gold sulfate) have entered Turkey.

Throughout the years, Turkish goods have entered the Armenian market through re-exportation via Georgia and Iran. Will the launch of direct transportation routes yield the expected economic results, and will it contribute to the economic development of the eastern regions of both the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey?

 It is difficult to say at this point. Leading Armenian economists and experts have expressed concerns that the direct entry of Turkish goods into Armenia could render Armenian products less competitive and push them out of the market. However, other experts believe that this will not happen, as regional markets will eventually reach a point where prices will level out.

In this context, it becomes clear that the process of normalizing Armenia-Turkey relations, establishing diplomatic ties, and reopening transportation corridors, which has been delayed by over 30 years, is now, more than ever, closer to becoming a reality. As difficult as this process is and as much effort as it requires, it seems equally unavoidable today.

Anahit Safaryan

Independent researcher