Quincy Institute Vice President comments on impact of Middle East developments on South Caucasus

Co-founder and executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft Trita Parsi has given an interview to Armenpress about the impact of the Middle East developments on South Caucasus, Iran’s policies in various directions, as well as the U.S. interests in South Caucasus and particularly in Armenia.

What impact could the latest developments in the Middle East have on the South Caucasus? How does Iran view the changing dynamics in the South Caucasus, especially considering Azerbaijan's actions in Nagorno-Karabakh and its growing ties with Israel?

There are several factors involved here. On the one hand, without a doubt, the Iranians have suffered some significant blows and already a weaker Iranian position is part of the reason why they essentially caved to the pressure on Armenia and kind of pulled back. Of course, Armenia's own failure to stand up against Azerbaijan, you know, paved the way for that. But under previous circumstances, if both Russia and Iran hadn't become weakened, I don't think the outcome would have looked the way it did. 

So, on the one hand, you already have that. On the other hand, you have a scenario in which Iranians have to rethink exactly how they want to pursue their strategy at this point. They made a lot of investments all the way out to Lebanon. Whereas something much closer to them is now at risk. And are they going to be reassigning priority? Are they going to try to double down and regain Syria, or instead move resources to make sure that their interest in the Caucuses is protected? That would require a very different approach in many different ways. Such an approach will probably see Iran's involvement in the Israel-Palestine theatre as a diversion, not helpful, etc. 

Then you have a third factor which is whereas Iranian-Turkish relations have always been characterized by a significant degree of tension, it has also been characterized by an almost unprecedented level of maturity. In a regional context, this is a relationship in which there have been, I think, I counted 19 wars between the Safavids and the Ottomans. And that's just that period. That's not going back to Cyrus the Great taking Lydia and all of those different things back then. So, there is a realisation on both sides to respect the other side as a major power. You cannot have a maximalist approach. You have to be pragmatic, and they have compartmentalized their relations. They can quarrel, even fight in Syria, at least earlier, and collaborate somewhere else. They don't allow one single issue to define the entire relationship. But there's been a significant shift in the balance now. On the one hand, what the Azeris have done in Nagorno Karabakh and on the other hand, what the Turks have now done [in Syria], which I think to a certain extent was accidental, they thought, HDS thought they would take Aleppo and that would be it. Instead, they take all of Syria. What does this do to elder guns? Ambitions? What does this do to fear on the Iranian side that always existed, which is that Erdogan is a Neo-Ottoman and that there's a real effort to be able to restore that Turkish position and squeeze out Iran simultaneously. And if that is the case, will this now translate into a much more aggressive position by the Turks in the Caucuses? And how does that affect these other two variables in the sense of can the Iranians afford to still try to be very active in Lebanon? Are you going to see a much more aggressive Azerbaijan? And from my distance, watching this, my impression has been that the Turks obviously are supporting the Azeris. But the Azeris are more aggressive than the Turks are, and [for Turkey] going forward is not necessarily intended. 

Moreover, you have another aspect here that is complicating things further. The Azeris are completely dependent on the Israelis militarily. They're very close to the Israelis and the Turks and the Israelis are bumping up against each other in Palestine. It's going to require a lot of finesse for there not to be some sort of if not confrontation, but certainly heightened tensions there. 

How will that affect Turkey's approach too? 

I've heard Turkish, not officials, but people close to AKP complain that Azeris are “so stupidly Pro Israel”, or “childishly Pro Israel” or something like that. They have a degree of frustration and unease with that as well. So, within all of these, the Iranians nevertheless have weaker cards than they did before. And areas that they thought were calm have now become activated. Areas where they thought that they were safe, such as Syria, have been lost. And then and a source factor in all of this, which is that at the end of the day, the most important thing for the Iranians right now is going to be to make a deal with the US. So that will take even more priority, but it will also be interesting to see where the US is on this issue. Because the US may end up being closer to Iran and Armenia on this issue than to Turkey and Azerbaijan. So, yes there's a disruptiveness in the region as a whole, and then massive disruptiveness coming in with the American angle that creates both challenges and opportunities. 

The U.S. has traditionally focused on energy routes and NATO allies, such as Turkey. What interests does the U.S. pursue in the South Caucasus today, particularly regarding Armenia's border security?

I think it's from the Biden administration. This was a political game that gave him another opportunity to be a problem in Russia's ‘near border’ area, which the Biden administration, with or without Ukraine, saw as valuable. I'm not so sure it's as valuable to Trump, to the Trump people, but also because it's not valuable they may not pay attention to it at all, and the old policy may continue by inertia. 

I think it's very unclear, I've not heard anyone make any particular comments about this, and what Trump is going to do regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Can we clearly define the specific interests that the US is pursuing in the South Caucasus, and namely on the borderline of Armenia? 

Well, I think one thing that is definitely in favor of the Armenians here is that the Trump crowd have a lot of people who would define themselves as Christian nationalists. And I don't really know what it is. I don't know if they know what it means as well, but it means that the Christian-Muslim variable in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, which I think was a complete non-issue for the Biden administration may very well become a rather potent issue for the Trump administration if they pay attention to it. 

I mean this is one of those things that has tended to be somewhat consistent with the Trump crowd,  whether they act on it consistently is a different story. They don't act on almost anything consistently so that's a non-issue in some ways. But I would suspect that the ANCA and some of the other Armenian groups will take significant advantage of this and they definitely have a tremendous amount of influence on some of these issues, so I wouldn't be surprised to see some potential changes here, but the first question is will it even be a priority? 

Even many Iranian experts believe that the position of the Azerbaijani authorities has drastically changed and is no longer constructive, particularly after the developments in the Middle East. What is your opinion on this?

I think part of the reason why the Iranians right now are trying to improve relations with Azerbaijan is precisely to prevent others from doing stupid things. 

Because they can do stupid things?

Yes, absolutely. Aliyev’s government is not viewed as a mature actor by his enemies, or by his friends. That's something almost everyone can agree upon. And of course, the fact that he is so dependent and so close to Israel also increases the likelihood that he will be under pressure by the Israelis to do things as part of the larger Iran-Israel conflict. 

Another very important issue, which is directly linked to Iran is the so-called Zangezur Corridor issue.  In your view, how determined is Iran to prevent any changes to its border with Armenia? How would Iran respond if Azerbaijan attempted to implement the so-called "Zangezur Corridor" project, which President Aliyev repeatedly mentions as a threat? In other words, is the so-called "Zangezur Corridor" a red line for Iran?

Not really my area of expertise, but I would speculate and say that it's actually either a red line or as close to a red line as possible. Part of the reason I say that is because historically it has been a red line. Yes, Iran is weakened but if Iran backtracks from that red line, the fear will be that a lot of other things that were neither red lines or didn't even have to be red lines —because they were not even up for discussion— would now become up for discussion. And, as a result, already we've seen that the Iranians had to retreat from Syria. Also, if this ends up becoming a cascade, it becomes very dangerous. It's one thing to do a strategic retreat and stop there. But if it becomes an uncontrollable cascade, which it very well may end up becoming if Iran suddenly starts to lose on several different fronts, then I think the Iranians will be put in a position in which they would have to put a lot of resources at least in one of these arenas to turn the momentum around.