



FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

ANNUAL REPORT

# ON EXTERNAL SECURITY RISKS OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

2026

A portrait of a woman with long, light brown hair, wearing a black short-sleeved dress and large pearl earrings. She is standing with her hands clasped in front of her. The background is a vibrant blue with large red diagonal stripes forming a star-like pattern. The text 'ADDRESS OF THE CHIEF OF THE SERVICE' is overlaid in white, bold, sans-serif capital letters. A thick red horizontal line is positioned below the text.

# ADDRESS OF THE CHIEF OF THE SERVICE

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■ Dear Reader,

This year the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Republic of Armenia enters the third year of its activity. December 31, 2025, essentially concludes the stage of institutional development of our Service, as prescribed by the legislative body of our country through the Law of the Republic of Armenia “On Foreign Intelligence Activity and the Foreign Intelligence Service”.

It seems redundant to say that in conditions of a rapidly changing global order, an international situation full of instability and conflict, insane economic, logistical and technological competition, and challenges brought about by artificial intelligence and technological innovations, it is vital to foresee, prevent, counter and disrupt the threats against our country and to protect and reinforce the statehood, the independence and the sovereignty of the Republic of Armenia. It is moreover crucial to identify the tactical and strategic opportunities, which can be decisive for the development and the endurance of our state.

The world we are observing is increasingly more interconnected – it is enormous and small at the same time. Processes that interest us require constant use of all of our senses as a Service – in 360 degrees and across all time zones.

We are required to exhibit professional integrity and pragmatic thinking that uncovers and objectively analyzes important facts and phenomena, and to express our conclusions truthfully, however difficult or undesirable they may be.

The target of our activities are the hostile or malicious intentions and activities of states, groups, and individuals, as well as other dangerous phenomena, while we focus on malign actors threatening our country and our democracy, and barriers to our development.

Intelligence services in general rarely report “good news”; the public, including our families and friends, are mainly unaware of such “good news”; and our Service is no exception in this regard. We are no exception in terms of our “bad news” either.

How do we then differ from the services of other countries, and what makes us unique? To us, as a Service, the answer lies in our favorite four words –the Republic of Armenia. It is the essence of our uniqueness and our constant purpose. It is the informed receiver of our “good news”. We have all joined the Service to serve the Republic of Armenia. To do it most effectively, we must tirelessly learn and advance our skills, train our thought and keep it open to the unfamiliar and ever-changing world, be self-critical about all our products, develop our aspiration to solve our problems in creative and innovative ways – improve every day and every hour.

**Kristinne Grigoryan, January 2026**

PART 1

# ABOUT THE REPORT

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■ Before turning to this year’s Report, we find it useful to address the assessments proposed in our first Annual Report, which was published in January 2025. The events that took place in 2025 demonstrated both the relevance and the accuracy of the assessments of the Service. In other words, no developments occurred within the scope of the priority directions and requirements of the Service that had not been predicted or the probability of which had not been accurately assessed. The Service has adopted the approach of addressing the assessments of the previous years’ report in order to shape a responsible institutional culture.

It is important to note that the Report reflects assessments of the Service on the main risks that directly or indirectly shape the security environment around the Republic of Armenia. Due to the limitations set in legislation on the state secret, as well as the objective necessity to protect sensitive information, the Report does not include classified information and data. At the same time, the Reports’ assessments are a result of comprehensive analysis of both open-source information and intelligence. The assessments in the Report are presented based on the progression of the events and their probability as assessed by the Service. The classification of probability is explained in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Assessment	Percentage of Probability
Almost Certain	>90%
Highly Likely	>75-90%
Likely	>50-75%
Possible	>35-50%
Unlikely	>20-35%
Highly Unlikely	>10-20%
Remote Chance	<10%

## PART 2

# MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT

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### ■ Military-Political Risks

#### Azerbaijan-Armenia

- As a result of the Washington agreements of August 8, 2025, military escalation in 2026 has become highly unlikely, while the likelihood of the institutionalization of peace has increased.
- The narratives and actions promoted by Azerbaijan on the so-called “western Azerbaijan” and the “return of western Azerbaijanis” create risks.

#### Russia-Ukraine

- A stable and lasting resolution of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2026 is unlikely.

#### Israel-Iran

- The risk of renewed mutual strikes between Israel and Iran will persist in 2026, expanding the scope of Armenia’s security problems.

#### Middle East

- The risk of continued armed clashes in the Middle East will likely persist in 2026.

### ■ Economic and Infrastructure Risks and Opportunities

- The positive dynamic of economic and infrastructure projects in our region will highly likely persist in 2026.
- In 2026, new economic, infrastructure, and trade initiatives will continually be the target of actors pursuing harmful aims in our region. This threat can materialize in the form of physical limitations, influence operations, and other malign activities.

### ■ Hybrid Threats Against Armenia in 2026

- Due to the elections scheduled for 2026, the influence operations conducted against Armenia by various foreign actors will highly likely become more comprehensive, complex and large-scale.
- Malign activities using distorted or out-of-context information, hostile cyber operations, activation of agents “on the ground”, generation of seemingly “home-grown” political activity, and organization of projects targeting, exploiting and manipulating the political views and patriotic feelings of youth and activist groups will likely persist.

### ■ International Terrorism

- In 2026, international terrorism will continue to be a constantly developing and transforming global threat, covering a wider geography.

### ■ Technologies

- Wide opportunities in testing new weapons on the battlefield will speed up the “production-testing-application” chain.

### ■ Military

- The role of drones in counter-drone combat will highly likely expand, and new perspectives will emerge for the integration of manned-unmanned aviation.
- AI will highly likely continue to limit the role of the human on the battlefield – not replacing, but reshaping the commander’s functions in the decision-making process.



PART 3

# MILITARY- POLITICAL RISKS

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Armenia - Azerbaijan border, Kirants ©primeminister.am





### ■ Armenia-Azerbaijan.

As a result of intensive bilateral high-level negotiations in 2025, as well as the Washington Declaration and the initialing of the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, achieved through the active involvement of the President of the United States Donald J. Trump, the likelihood of a military escalation has significantly decreased, while the likelihood of a peaceful resolution has increased. Based on a thorough analysis of these and parallel processes, we assess a military escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, motivated by a military-political objective, as highly unlikely in 2026. We also assess local actions or incidents not driven by military-political objectives as unlikely.

In 2026, it is highly likely that progress will be achieved in the delimitation and demarcation process, bilateral trade and economic initiatives, dialogue between the two societies, humanitarian, and other issues. With regard to the unblocking of regional infrastructures as well, progress will highly likely be reached in ongoing processes, and the bilateral connectivity initiatives with Armenia's neighbors will boost bigger regional economic projects. At the same time, risks of malign activities against these processes by states that pursue the goal of maintaining and expanding their influence in the region will increase. The consistent use of harmful narratives and terms questioning Armenia's sovereignty and threatening the implementation of connectivity projects by Azerbaijan and other actors will only contribute to the materialization of these risks.

The analysis of the Service suggests that the state-promoted narratives and parallel activities related to the so-called “western Azerbaijan” and the “return of western Azerbaijanis” are a risk factor that has a significant negative impact on peace-building in the long term. The intelligence collected by the Service indicates that Azerbaijan has not only reduced, but has significantly increased this propaganda since the Washington Declaration, which entails substantial risks for regional stability, security, and long-term peace.

In 2026, a priority task for the Service will be the continuous assessment of the true intention behind the state policy of promoting the “return of western Azerbaijanis”. In particular, it needs to be assessed whether by using these narratives as a new national ideology Azerbaijan intends to transport the conflict into the territory of Armenia in some new form or to use it as a tool for foreign policy bargaining and, more precisely, as a way to offset the issue of the return of Karabakh Armenians.




Chart 1. A quantitative comparison of all publications on the topic of “western Azerbaijan” on 138 days preceding and following August 8, 2025, shows that their volume **increased** approximately **by 36%** after August 8. An overview of 1 state news outlet and 4 pro-government websites is covered.

**Aygun Aliyeva: Record number of projects on Western Azerbaijan funded in 2025**

DOMESTIC POLICY 06 November, 2025 • 11:29

The State Agency for Support to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) of Azerbaijan funded a **record number of projects** related to Return to Western Azerbaijan in 2025, **Aygun Aliyeva**, Executive Director of the agency, said during a public discussion, Report informs.


Aliyeva noted that both the quality and quantity of NGO projects are steadily improving: "A total of 24 projects were funded in this area through the agency in 2024. In 2025, that number has reached 51-a record figure. In 2023-2025, NGOs have organized nearly 50 conferences, presentations, meetings, exhibitions, and public hearings, published 25 books, produced 11 documentaries, and created 21 video clips under these projects."

The director emphasized that, as in recent years, the Return to Western Azerbaijan process will remain a **priority in the 2026 grant competitions**: "Currently, submitted projects are undergoing expert evaluation. Priority will be given to initiatives such as organizing **conferences abroad on Western Azerbaijan**, hosting side events at international and regional organizations, and preparing and disseminating joint reports with foreign NGOs."

**The topic of the so-called "western Azerbaijan" outlined as a priority for Azerbaijan's state grants in 2025-2026.**  
©report.az



Moreover, the Service has observed an increase in Azerbaijan's military expenditure. We assess this as a risk factor not only due to the net increase of military spending, but also the fact that the growth rate of military expenditure substantially exceeds that of spending on other sectors and, in many cases, highly likely, occurs at their expense.



In Chart 2, military and other expenditures in Azerbaijan's budget in 2024-2026 have been compared with respective allocations in 2023. Military spending for 2026 has increased by around 44%, while that on other sectors has increased by only 7.4%. In 2026, there is even a drop in non-military expenditure compared to 2025, while military spending continues to grow.



Chart 3 demonstrates the observed growth of military spending in Azerbaijan's budget.

■ **Russia-Ukraine.** Based on a thorough analysis of the balance of power on the battlefield, the political objectives of the conflicting parties, and the interests of global actors, the Service assesses the stable and long-term resolution of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2026 as unlikely.

Despite the current intensity of the negotiations, in 2026 the sides will highly likely continue to pursue mutually exclusive goals and diametrically opposing positions over issues that each defines as vital for itself. This will, in turn, preserve grounds for the military expression of the conflict.

It is likely that Ukraine will maintain its ability to resist Russia's military activities in 2026. At the same time, in terms of the potential to successfully continue warfighting, Russia has a significant advantage in the medium term.

Another key challenge for Ukraine is ensuring internal stability. In conditions of a war of attrition, objectively accumulated internal disagreements and active geopolitical tensions even the narrative of elections per se carries a large risk of unpredictable consequences.

Nevertheless, at least a substantial part of sanctions imposed on Russia will almost certainly stay in force, which will continue posing risks for Armenia's economy, including in terms of secondary sanctions. At the same time, the continuous polarization between certain geopolitical centers will highly likely exacerbate the existing risks in terms of balancing Armenia's foreign political and economic relations.



"Dragon's Teeth" anti-tank obstacles in the Kharkiv region of Ukraine, March 2025.  
Photo by Diego Fedele/Getty Images



Iranian Fattah hypersonic ballistic missile displayed in Tehran, 2023. Photo by Hossein Zohrevand/Tasnim News Agency via AP

■ **Israel-Iran.** The Israel-Iran war has had a significant impact on the policies of the actors of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, shaping a new power balance in the region. The situation is further complicated by the determination of the status of non-state armed groups in the Middle East, the uncertainties related to their future activity, and the conflicting positions of the regional and non-regional actors in this regard.

Due to the Israel-Iran war, Iran's nuclear and missile programs have been pushed back but not completely neutralized. In the post-war period, the agenda of negotiations with Iran has been modified in practice and, apart from the nuclear program, includes Iran's missile capabilities and its Middle East policy.

In the post-war period the two countries are each working to eliminate the vulnerabilities uncovered during the war and developing their military capabilities.

After the 12-day war as well, the topic of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the USA will remain a factor affecting processes of a larger context.

Considering the fact that the 12-day war between Israel and Iran did not result in either side achieving all of its strategic goals, the likelihood of a war or mutual strikes of a different intensity remains high. This, in turn, will expand the scope of security issues for the Republic of Armenia in terms of managing the movement of groups posing migration and other types of threats, emergence of economic and logistical problems, and diversification of risks threatening consolidation of peace in the South Caucasus.

At the same time, the success of the Islamic system in managing the ongoing domestic processes in Iran will almost certainly have a significant impact on the materialization of the agendas promoted by both Middle Eastern and extra-regional actors. An increase in instability in Iran would further amplify Armenia's security risks.



Israel Air Force F-35 fighter jet. Photo by AP Photo/Ariel Schalit



■ **Middle East.** Despite the preconditions created for a lasting ceasefire, the risk of resumption of military activities in the Gaza strip will likely persist, if Hamas does not take steps toward disarmament for an extended period, and as long as Israel rejects solutions offered by actors guaranteeing the ceasefire. A contributing factor in this regard will be internal developments in Israel in 2026.

The tensions in Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Syria relations in 2026 will almost certainly persist. Israel will continue to view internal developments in Syria and Lebanon as conditions for decreasing the tensions with the two countries and normalizing relations. Israel will thereby consolidate the strategy of keeping the conflicts outside of its borders and imposing solutions while reasoning it by the need to ensure its own security.

It is likely that the unstable situation in Syria will continue. Establishing control over the entire territory of the country, limiting the presence of external powers, reinvigorating the economy, and building pragmatic relations with neighbors will remain the main challenges of Syria's interim government. The success of addressing these challenges will depend not only on the readiness and ability of Syria's ethnic and religious minorities to support unity, but also on the approaches of other state actors that perceive their own regional security issues as linked to developments in Syria.

It is unlikely that the efforts of Lebanon's government to ensure monopoly over the military will be effective in 2026, which, in turn, will increase the likelihood of continued operations by Israel in Lebanon.



■ **CSTO.** The 2026 assessment of the Service with regard to Armenia-CSTO relations matches the assessment of the previous year. In particular, “unfreezing” of Armenia’s membership in the CSTO will almost certainly not happen, which we continue to assess as a challenge to the organization’s reputation and a “food for thought” for other member states of the bloc.

PART 4

# ECONOMIC AND LOGISTICAL RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

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Meeting between the representatives of Armenia and Türkiye in Akhurik, 2025 ©mfa.am

■ In 2025, the race for economic and logistical projects between global and regional actors continued. For the countries of the region, conditions are created to reduce tensions and ensure regional security. The dynamics of global and regional competition for such projects will almost certainly persist in 2026.

While regional infrastructure and economic projects are not the only drivers of the institutionalization of peace, they have considerable potential for increasing the price of military escalation. They additionally provide the countries of the region with an opportunity to strengthen their own political and economic standing by engaging in such projects.

The full unblocking of our region and, in particular, the possible restoration of the Kars-Gyumri railroad, the implementation of the TRIPP project, and the potential bilateral initiatives with our neighbors will create extensive economic and logistical opportunities in terms of diversification of markets and expansion of regional trade.

It can create proportional growth opportunities for the population of bordering regions on both sides in the west (Armenia-Türkiye), and the east (Armenia-Azerbaijan). In addition, restoration of connectivity with Türkiye and Azerbaijan will enable faster and more cost-efficient transportation of people, goods, and services which will enhance the competitiveness of the region, as well as its international appeal.

We assess it as highly likely that the positive dynamic of both economic and infrastructure projects will persist in 2026.

At the same time, infrastructural geopolitics demonstrate how state actors take advantage of infrastructures by using economic leverage and creating dependencies in order to expand their own influence. We therefore assess that, in 2026, new economic, infrastructure and trade initiatives will continually be a target of various actors pursuing harmful aims in the region, which can take the form of physical limitations, influence operations and other malign activities.

# HYBRID THREATS

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With regard to the external threats that our country faces this year, assessments on predicted foreign interference and hybrid threats objectively take up a lot of space due to the general elections scheduled in Armenia in 2026.

Before proceeding to hybrid threats against Armenia, we find it useful to elaborate on how the Service defines the materialization of hybrid threats – “hybrid warfare”. It should be noted that there is no universal or internationally codified definition of this term, which also gives actors resorting to hybrid warfare an opportunity to target the accuracy and the specificity of the term itself.

### ■ What is Hybrid Warfare?

Hybrid warfare is the overt and covert application of a combination of various means (military, economic, information) with a common intent and with the objective of harming the target by creating uncertainties, anxiety, paralysing the usual activity of state institutions, and swaying public opinion in a favorable direction, while complicating options to attribute and counteract these actions. These methods can include, for instance, use of informal armed groups, economic pressure such as unpublicized economic sanctions, activation of local political actors receptive to foreign influence and others.

It should be noted that, depending on the case and the objective, the actor using a hybrid toolkit can resort to different combinations of the aforementioned means.

### ■ Hybrid Threats Against Armenia in 2026

In 2025, Armenia faced various manifestations of hybrid threats, which, due to the elections scheduled for 2026, will highly likely become more comprehensive, complex and large-scale.

Hybrid activities directed against Armenia pursue multiple goals, including stripping the opportunity for peace of its value and significance, belittling its very fact, as well as the achievements on the path to peace and the positivity around it; instilling conspiracy theories to make it seem as if secret agreements have been made against Armenia's interests; and exploiting the sensitivities of our compatriots displaced from Karabakh by serving our public with false geopolitical choices.

In 2026, it is highly likely that hybrid activities aiming to influence the implementation of TRIPP project will become substantially more active. As outlined in 2025, the regional and non-regional actors targeting the project highly likely conduct partially overlapping activities, even when pursuing different objectives.



The toolkit used by state and non-state actors engaged in hybrid activities against Armenia will highly likely include:

#### **a. Hostile Cyber Operations**

These operations aim to paralyse Armenia's critical infrastructures and incapacitate their management, to disrupt the provision of vital services, etc. It is highly likely that the targets will be:

- financial and banking institutions;
- transport and communication infrastructures;
- digital platforms of the government (such as those of the Central Electoral Commission, district and precinct electoral commissions), including digital infrastructures used for the provision of public services;
- digital infrastructures of electric grids, etc.


#### **b. Malign Information Operations**

In the pre-election period, the malign information operations by external actors are conducted in the form of targeting our public with fake and distorted and out-of-context information, and importing narratives contradicting Armenia's interests with the goal of influencing the votes. A combination of overt and covert information operations is used.

Overt activities are usually conducted by foreign state/government bodies, including special services and associated resources.

Covert activities, which often feed and multiply overt activities, use websites and accounts that do not bear visible traces of any foreign state actor in order to spread more extreme and shocking narratives.

In 2025, we have observed tactics of spreading disinformation, as well as false or distorted information, through fake accounts and advertisements, and bot networks. Opportunities for generating fake text, audio and video content using AI have continued to grow, setting a stable trend of spreading a large volume of disinformation through the use of flexible and rapidly-developing tools. This trend will highly likely become more widespread in 2026.




We assess that in 2026 the trend of planting false information in foreign outlets and then “legitimizing” it through official and unofficial resources of regional actors will persist, as was the case in 2025.

Another persisting method will likely be the creation of new platforms for the publication and subsequent dissemination of disinformation.

In 2025, we have observed uses of new resources, including ones imitating real persons and websites, that have highly likely been created exclusively for the purpose of spreading fake information.

The most dangerous trend of malign influence operations will continue to be the seemingly subtle combination of fake information with true information, as well as its dissemination and consolidation through real platforms and persons with wide audiences.



### **c.Activation of Agents, Agents of Influence, Political Actors Acting Under the Cover of Business Activities, Religious and Cultural Institutions and Their Widely-Known Representatives**

In 2025, there has already been growth in instances of foreign interference into Armenia's domestic affairs. The referenced toolkit includes both activation of a network of agents operating in Armenia and supported groups, and activities directed at the cultivation of new political forces in Armenia's domestic arena (political engineering).

One of the hybrid activities aimed at causing internal instability is the cultivation of seemingly "home-grown" political activity, its financing through different means, as well as its information support and organization. Projects targeting youth and activist groups, exploiting and manipulating their political views and patriotic feelings are implemented with the purpose of subsequently using the groups to achieve the goals of foreign actors. Under the guise of public diplomacy, education, sports and educational events, activities related to ideological preparation and recruitment are organized, which make the targeted groups often unwittingly become part of a larger foreign interference scheme.

In terms of cultivation and use of various actors in the pre-election period, businessmen, religious and cultural figures, as well as elements of organized crime that are directly or indirectly linked to decision-making circles of a foreign country, play a special role.

These actors can be engaged in the pre-election and post-election stages, as well as on the voting day in order to organize sabotage activities under the guise of acts of public disobedience.

The objective of such activities is to undermine Armenia's resistance, devitalize the democratic order by delegitimising or effectively diminishing the legitimacy of free, fair and transparent elections, and, if successful, also forming a government receptive to influence that contradicts Armenia's interests and is "convenient" for foreign actors.

#### **d. Economic and Energy Pressure**

Considering the structure and the primary directions of imports and exports of goods from the Republic of Armenia, in 2025 we have observed seemingly objective, but in reality artificially created barriers (including through non-state actors) that range from confiscation of goods to criminal cases against exporters, mass arrests of exporting technical staff, deportations, and others. The purpose of these measures is to cause discontent among voters engaged in business activities and swaying their votes. This trend has been recorded in 2025 and will highly likely persist in 2026.

The energy sector, while unlikely, can be an effective area of hybrid activities, if a decision is made to escalate the pressure on Armenia.

Changes in migration regulations and their selective application are also likely to be used as part of the hybrid toolkit against migrants with Armenian citizenship. This also pursues the goal of generating dissatisfaction with the government and affecting votes.

#### **e. Other Forms of Pressure**

As yet another example of influence operations, in 2026 there may be continued targeting of high-level officials from Armenia's executive and legislative bodies and their family members, as well as of new defamatory campaigns against them. Simultaneously, there may be promotion of political and other figures viewed as favorable by the targeting side.

The fact that Armenia is going to host large reputable events in 2026 makes it likely that actors using a hybrid toolkit will try to undermine Armenia's international standing as an organizer of events of an international scale.



# INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

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In 2025 the number of international terrorist attacks has continued to be high, encompassing a wider geography. We are observing a trend of expansion of international terrorism from the Middle East to the Sahel region of Africa. In 2026, jihadist groups will likely continue to use the “vacuum” left after the departure of French, US and UN forces and expand their influence.

Syria and the Democratic Republic of Congo remain the primary centers of activity of the Islamic State (ISIS), which operates in at least 22 countries.

In 2026, the activity of ISIS in Syria will almost certainly continue, especially after Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. At the same time, other armed/terrorist groups in Syria will highly likely maintain their ability to execute attacks, which, in turn, can create conditions for groups dissatisfied with Syria's new authorities to resume the attacks.

Terrorist groups increasingly rely on new technologies, including more secure communication and cryptocurrencies, which will highly likely increase the complexity of preventing attacks and accessing information. In 2026, international terrorism will remain a constantly developing and transforming international threat, so continuous cooperation between intelligence services will remain a key component of the fight against international terrorism.

From the standpoint of international organized crime, the visa-free regime with a large number of countries will continue to create risks for us in terms of Armenia being used as a transit country by members of international terrorist groups. Another threat is the smuggling of drugs to Armenia and further transportation through our territory to other countries.

As a responsible actor of international law, Armenia is committed to continuing improving its capabilities to fight international organized crime and to expand cooperation with international partners.

PART 7

# TENDENCIES IN TECHNOLOGY AND ARMAMENTS DEVELOPMENT

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■ The competition for technologies that provide strategic advantage and for minerals that make them possible almost certainly will become more pronounced in 2026. The production of technologies, such as semiconductors and integrated circuits, quantum technologies, satellite systems (including Internet of Things), clean energy technologies, biotechnologies, AI-enabled weapons, is turning into an indicator of national power, while states possessing reserves of critical minerals and rare earth elements are gaining new geopolitical leverage. On the other hand, aspirations to establish self-sufficient supply chains and autonomous production processes will highly likely drive up production costs, slow down the pace of technological development, and, in some cases, lead to resource nationalism.

The pace of production of arms and military technologies will highly likely continue to increase in 2026. Active conflicts will even further increase arms demands, while wide opportunities in testing new weapons on the battlefield will speed up the “production-testing-application” chain, making the competitive arms market even more technology-driven and even more competitive, including through the expansion of non-military technology development by defence industrial companies.

In 2025 technologies continued to dictate the tempo of military operations, transforming the forms of traditional warfare.

Technologies with asymmetric advantage have expanded the opportunities of contactless warfare. In 2026 the technological sophistication of unmanned systems will enable their employment in more complex operations, including those conducted beyond the operator's line of sight. The role of drones in counter-drone combat will highly likely expand, and new perspectives will emerge for the integration of manned-unmanned aviation. The role of traditional effectors and aviation will remain decisive in terms of implementing the intent to achieve a pronounced advantage over the adversary. AI will highly likely continue limiting the role of the human on the battlefield – not replacing, but reshaping the commander's functions in the decision-making process and developing the human-machine interaction in real time.



# FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

